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Abstract
This paper studies how rms can e¢ ciently incentivize supervisors
to truthfully report employee performance. To this end, I develop
a dynamic principal-supervisor-agent model. The supervisor is ei-
ther selsh or altruistic towards the agent, which is observable to the
agent but not to the principal. The analysis yields two key results.
First, supervisor altruism sometimes provides a net incentive to re-
port performance truthfully, rather than to bias evaluations upward.
The intuition is that an altruistic supervisor values his job because
of his good relationship with the agent, and puts his job at risk by
overrating the agents performance. Second, I show that by screening
for one supervisor type, rms can incentivize the supervisor to truth-
fully report performance at the lowest possible costs. For this reason,
screening may be optimal, even though it reduces the probability that
vacancies are lled.
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tive performance evaluation, supervisor.
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1 Introduction
Many rms incentivize their employees on the basis of subjective performance
evaluation (MacLeod and Malcomson 1998, Prendergast 1999, MacLeod and
Parent 2000, Gibbs et al. 2004, Gibbs 2012). Moreover, the actual appraisal
of employee performance is often not conducted by rm owners, but dele-
gated to supervisors. There is ample evidence that supervisors exert bias
in appraising performance.1 Such bias may be harmful to rms because it
weakens the link between employeesactual performance and their perfor-
mance evaluation. In turn, this reduces employeesincentives to exert e¤ort.
Firms therefore have an interest in stimulating supervisors to report perfor-
mance truthfully. This paper develops and analyzes a model to study how
rms can achieve this through designing optimal contracts for supervisors
and employees.
In the model, the agent chooses a privately observable, continuous e¤ort
level that generates a high or low performance. To induce the agent to exert
e¤ort, the principal wishes to pay the agent a bonus if his performance is high.
The agents performance is not veriable, but can be subjectively evaluated.
Since the principal does not observe the agents performance herself, she
hires a supervisor to perform this task. The supervisor is either selsh or
altruistic towards the agent, and may therefore bias performance evaluations.
Supervisors altruism is observed by the agent but not by the principal. For
simplicity, I focus on the case where the unconditional probability that the
supervisor is altruistic equals one half.
The agency problem is studied in an innitely repeated game. As is usual
in the repeated games literature, the agent is assumed to play a trigger strat-
egy that prescribes to shirk in all future periods if the supervisor has once
biased his performance evaluation (see e.g. Bull 1987). Next, as in Baker et
al. (1994), I assume there is a veriable signal about the agents performance
available to the principal. The veriable signal is necessary for incentivizing
the supervisor to report performance truthfully, as will be explained below.
Allowing for objective incentives for the agent on the basis of this veriable
signal does not change the results of the analysis qualitatively, and so for
simplicity I abstract from this in the analysis. Further, I assume there is a
large pool of supervisors and agents. Therefore, if a current labor relationship
1Well-known biases are the leniency bias and the centrality bias. See for example
Medo¤ and Abraham (1980), Jawahar and Williams (1997), Prendergast (1999), Moers
(2005), Berger et al. (2011), and Bol (2011).
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breaks down, the principal will be rematched to a new agent and/or super-
visor in the next period. Finally, throughout the paper I restrict attention
to the case where the principal o¤ers a uniform contract to the supervisor.
The analysis yields two key results. First, given the optimal contracts, su-
pervisors altruism may provide a net incentive to report performance truth-
fully, rather than to bias evaluations. Second, for relatively low and relatively
high values of the discount factor, the principal optimally designs the super-
visors contract such that it only attracts altruistic types. In the remainder
of the Introduction, the results are described and explained in more detail.
In case the supervisor is altruistic, he enjoys to some extent the well-
being of the agent. Therefore, the altruistic supervisor has an incentive to
report the agents performance to be high, irrespective of the agents actual
performance. The reason is that reporting high performance will yield the
agent a valuable bonus. However, the agent only has an incentive to exert
e¤ort if he expects the supervisor to report performance truthfully. In the
repeated game, the supervisor will do so only if the following holds: reporting
performance truthfully yields future rents, the discounted value of which
exceeds the current benet from overreporting. To satisfy this condition
in the most e¢ cient way, the principal optimally uses the following three
compensation elements.
First, note that the lower the altruistic supervisors current benet from
overreporting, the lower the rents he requires to report performance truth-
fully. The principal therefore optimally makes it costly to the supervisor to
report high performance. This is achieved by tying the supervisors compen-
sation to his evaluation report, as in Giebe and Gürtler (2012). Clearly, a
monetary penalty following a high performance rating makes it attractive for
the selsh supervisor type to bias performance ratings downward. This is
costly to the principal since now the selsh type must be paid rents to report
performance truthfully. The optimal penalty for reporting high performance
therefore trades o¤ the rents paid to the selsh type against the rents paid
to the altruistic type, and depends on whether or not the principal screens
for a supervisor type, as will become clear below.
Second, to ensure that reporting performance truthfully yields future
rents, the supervisor receives a monetary reward if the veriable signal about
the agents performance is high. To understand why, note that the agent re-
sponds to a biased performance evaluation by shirking in the future. If the
agent shirks, the veriable signal will be low. Therefore, biasing the agents
performance evaluation reduces the supervisors compensation in the future.
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Third, to maximize the supervisors incentives to report performance
truthfully, his utility after biasing a performance evaluation is set as low
as possible. This is achieved by paying the supervisor a low base salary. The
base salary can be set as low as necessary. This holds because a low base
salary can be compensated for by paying the supervisor a higher reward if
the veriable signal about the agents performance is high. Because the su-
pervisor can always take his outside option, the implication is that his utility
after biasing an evaluation optimally equals at most his reservation utility.
In equilibrium, the principal sets the three compensation elements dis-
cussed above such that the supervisors uniform contract is attractive to
both types, or only to the altruistic type. In the former case, I say that the
supervisors contract is a pooling contract, whereas in the latter case I say
that the supervisors contract is a screening contract. The crucial feature of
the screening contract is that it reveals the supervisors type. This infor-
mation is valuable to the principal because it enables her to eliminate the
supervisors current benet from biasing the performance evaluation. This
is achieved by setting the right penalty for giving the agent a high perfor-
mance evaluation. The benet to the principal is that the supervisor does
not require a rent to report performance truthfully. Further, since in this
case inducing correct performance evaluations from the supervisor does not
generate agency costs, it is also optimal to provide the agent the rst-best
level of the bonus. Screening for one supervisor type thus yields the principal
rst-best prots, conditional on being matched. Assuming that the principal
optimally screens, it holds that she optimally screens for the altruistic type.
The reason is that, in contrast to the selsh type, the altruistic type enjoys
working with the agent. The altruistic type therefore demands a lower total
compensation level to accept the job. This feature also explains why the
screening contract does not attract the selsh type.
Next, if the principal o¤ers the pooling contract to the supervisor, at least
one supervisor type enjoys a benet from biasing the performance evaluation
in the current period. This is inevitable because one type is selsh and the
other is altruistic, but the penalty for giving a high performance evaluation
can only take one value. It follows that at least one type must enjoy fu-
ture rents to be willing to report performance truthfully. Interestingly, the
altruistic supervisor enjoys future rents from reporting truthfully precisely
because he is altruistic. The reason is that he enjoys altruistic utility from
working with the agent. This utility cannot be extracted from the altruistic
type, since doing so would make the job unattractive to the selsh type. It
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follows that, as long as he reports performance truthfully, the altruistic types
utility is strictly above his reservation utility. However, as explained above,
the optimal contract ensures that any type of supervisor earns at most his
reservation utility after biasing a performance evaluation. Biasing an evalu-
ation thus implies that the altruistic type will lose the future rents derived
from working with the agent. Therefore, supervisor altruism not only gives
an incentive to overreport performance, but it also provides an incentive to
report performance truthfully. Moreover, if the supervisor is su¢ ciently pa-
tient, the latter e¤ect outweighs the former. In that case, the net incentive
from supervisor altruism is to report performance truthfully, rather than to
bias performance evaluations.
The optimal contracts in case the principal attracts both supervisor types
are as follows. If the supervisor is very patient, then even if the agents bonus
is high, the altruistic type prefers to report performance truthfully, as de-
scribed above. The principal therefore only needs to incentivize the selsh
type to report performance truthfully. By the same intuition as in the screen-
ing case, the optimal way to do so is by letting the supervisors compensation
be independent of the supervisors evaluation report. This ensures that the
selsh type is indi¤erent to his evaluation report, and hence does not have
to be paid costly rents for rating truthfully. As in the screening case, agency
costs from subjective performance evaluation are now fully avoided, implying
it is optimal to provide the agent with the rst-best level of the bonus.
If the supervisor is less patient, and the agents bonus is high, the altru-
istic supervisor prefers to bias performance evaluations. The principal can
respond to this situation by reducing the agents bonus, such that supervi-
sor altruism again provides a net incentive to report performance truthfully.
Alternatively, she may increase the supervisors compensation to ensure re-
porting truthfully yields su¢ cient rents. The principal can also pursue both
strategies simultaneously. However, in any case it holds that the lower the
supervisors patience, the lower the principals prots. Therefore, if the su-
pervisor is su¢ ciently impatient, it becomes optimal to screen. Screening
is costly because the supervisor may reject the job o¤er, in which case the
principal earns his reservation utility. Yet, these costs are outweighed by
the benets from increasing the agents incentives, and eventually reducing
the supervisors compensation, conditional on the supervisor accepting his
contract. I call this the incentive motivefor screening.
Finally, screening is also optimal if players are su¢ ciently patient. This
may seem counterintuitive, since it has just been explained that attracting
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both supervisor types yields high prots in this case. However, if the principal
does not screen, she cannot enjoy the compensating wage di¤erential that
hiring only the altruistic supervisor gives rise to. If the principal is su¢ ciently
patient, she is willing to incur the costs of screening to enjoy higher prots
once having found an altruistic supervisor. I call this the wage di¤erential
motivefor screening.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related litera-
ture. Section 3 describes the model, which is solved in section 4. Section 5
nishes with concluding remarks.
2 Related literature
Supervisor altruism as a source of bias in performance evaluation has received
considerable attention. A seminal paper in the eld is Prendergast and Topel
(1996). The authors show that in response to biased performance ratings,
rms may optimally reduce incentives for agents, limit authority of super-
visors, and use bureaucratic rules in pay and promotion decisions. Lee and
Persson (2011) extend Prendergast and Topel (1996) by allowing the agent
and the supervisor to be mutually altruistic. They show that supervisors
altruism induces leniency, whereas agents altruism induces loyalty. More-
over, the benets from the agents loyalty may outweigh the negative e¤ects
from the supervisors leniency, such that the principal is better o¤with good
social relationships in the workplace. Another extension of Prendergast and
Topel (1996) is Grund and Przemeck (2012), who consider a situation where
two inequality averse agents must be supervised. In this case, the altruistic
supervisor not only inates ratings, but also compresses ratings in order to
reduce inequality between the agents.2
As already noted by Prendergast and Topel (1996), incentives can be used
to align supervisors behavior with the rms interest, rather than with his
social preferences. This claim receives empirical support from Bandiera et
2Other supervisor preferences potentially causing distorted ratings have been analyzed
in the economic literature. Müller and Weinschenk (2011) derive optimal contracts when
the supervisor su¤ers from the horns and haloe¤ect, that is, the tendency to give perfor-
mance evaluations close to the ones given in the past. Golman and Bhatia (2012) assume
the supervisor observes noisy signals of the agents performance, and feels worse about
unfavorable mistakes compared to favorable ones. Kamphorst and Swank (2012) analyze
supervisors rating behavior when the supervisor simultaneously wants to strengthen the
agents self-condence, and come across as a capable evaluator of the agents performance.
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al. (2009). In a eld experiment, the authors exogenously vary supervisors
compensation from a xed wage to a bonus based on the productivity of
supervised workers. Bandiera et al. (2009) report that supervisors respond
to this change by assisting workers in a more rm-e¢ cient way, rather than
assisting the workers they are socially connected to. In line with this, Berger
et al. (2011) nd that supervisors who share in company prots or receive
performance pay make better promotion decisions. Studying this issue the-
oretically, Giebe and Gürtler (2012) derive optimal incentive contracts for
employees and supervisors when it is the supervisors task to evaluate the
agents performance. In their model, the supervisor may be either selsh or
altruistic towards the agent, which is private information as in Prendergast
and Topel (1996). The authors show that inducing correct performance eval-
uations from the altruistic type may only be possible at the cost of reducing
the agents incentives, and paying the supervisor costly rents. For this rea-
son, the principal may optimally choose not to eliminate leniency from the
altruistic supervisor at all. In this case the agent will still exert e¤ort be-
cause with some probability she will face the selsh supervisor, who reports
performance truthfully.
The present paper contributes to the existing literature in the following
ways. First, the model developed and analyzed here is dynamic which en-
ables me to study workplace relationships where interaction is repeated over
time. This feature of the model gives rise to the rst key result, namely
that supervisor altruism may provide a net incentive to report performance
truthfully, rather than to bias performance evaluations. Second, as is realis-
tic in long-term workplace relationships, I assume that the agent knows the
supervisors type, and therefore knows whether or not the supervisor will
be lenient in rating his performance. Last, this paper highlights an opti-
mal response to the possibility of supervisor bias in performance evaluations
that has not been considered before, namely to attract only one supervisor
type. A screening contract reveals the supervisors type, which consequently
enables the principal to more e¢ ciently incentivize the supervisor to report
performance truthfully. To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst study
to analyze optimal screening for supervisor types.3
3Since the seminal analysis by Spence (1973), screening for productive agents has be-
come a well-known concept. Recently, screening for agents with some social preference
also has attracted quite some attention. See for example Sliwka (2007), Delfgaauw and
Dur (2007, 2008), Kosfeld and Von Siemens (2010, 2011), Non (2012), and Von Siemens
(2011, 2012).
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By studying an innitely repeated game, this paper is also related to the
literature on relational contracts (see e.g. Bull 1987, MacLeod and Malcom-
son 1989 and 1998, Baker et al. 1994, and Levin 2003). Closely related
are Cordero Salas and Roe (2012) and Dur and Tichem (forthcoming). Both
studies show that a more altruistic principal nds it easier to credibly promise
a bonus to the agent. Similarly, the analysis here shows that supervisor altru-
ism may provide an incentive to report performance truthfully. In contrast to
the present paper, the relational contracts literature generally assumes that a
residual claimant principal evaluates the agents performance. An exception
is Thiele (2013), who studies a principal-supervisor-agent-model that allows
for the possibility of collusion between the supervisor and the agent. This
analysis di¤ers from Thiele (2013) in that I abstract from collusion. Instead,
it is assumed that bias in performance evaluations stems only from the su-
pervisors altruism towards the agent. Also, I study the role of uncertainty
about the supervisors type to the principal, and assume there is veriable
information about the agents performance available to the principal.
Finally, Sol (2010) studies the use of peer evaluations to incentivize em-
ployees, and allows peers to be altruistic or spiteful towards each other. Al-
truism and spite lead peers to internalize part of their co-workerswell-being,
which implies that peers have an incentive to bias performance evaluations.
Sol (2010) shows that the principal can ensure truthful peer evaluations by
reducing the bonus tied to a positive evaluation, which is sometimes found
to be optimal in the present analysis as well. Sol (2010) also shows that if
peer evaluation becomes severely constrained because feelings of altruism or
spite are strong, the principal optimally uses team incentives in addition to
peer evaluation.
3 The model
Consider a world with one principal, many agents and many supervisors. All
players live an innite number of periods, denoted by t = 0; 1; 2; ::: Future
periods are discounted at a common discount factor . Each period the
principal may employ one agent and one supervisor. When employed by
the principal, the agent chooses a privately observable e¤ort level, e. E¤ort
yields a non-veriable performance, denoted by V 2 f0; 1g. The probability
that the agents performance is high is Pr [V = 1] = e. V is observed by the
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agent and the supervisor, but not by the principal.4 The agents e¤ort also
produces a veriable signal z 2 f0; 1g, which is modeled in the same way as
in Baker et al. (1994). The probability that the veriable signal takes a high
value is Pr [z = 1] = e. The parameter  has an expectation E [] = 1, a
variance 2 > 0, and  is privately observed by the agent before exerting
e¤ort. The costs of exerting e¤ort are given by 1
2
e2. Note that the rst-best
e¤ort level is therefore equal to eFB = 1

. To ensure that the probability that
V = 1 is properly dened, it is assumed that   1. It is also assumed that
 and the support of  are such that Pr [z = 1] 2 [0; 1].
In the analysis, I assume that the principal incentivizes the agent only on
the basis of subjective evaluation of the agents performance V .5 Since the
principal does not observe the agents performance herself, it is the supervi-
sors task to evaluate the agents performance. The supervisors evaluation
report is denoted by d 2 f0; 1g, where d = 0 means "V = 0", and d = 1
means "V = 1". Importantly, the principal can commit to reward the agent
on the basis of the supervisors report.6 The principal can therefore o¤er the
agent a fully enforceable contract, which consists of a base salary a, and a
bonus b to be paid if the supervisor reports performance is high (d = 1). The
agents utility in period t can now be written as:
UA = wA   1
2
e2, (1)
where wA  a+db is the agents total compensation. The agents reservation
4It is a feature of many large rms that rm-owners do not observe the performance of
individual employees. See also e.g. Prendergast and Topel (1996) and Giebe and Gürtler
(2012), who make the same assumption.
5Sometimes the principal can attain strictly higher prots by also incentivizing the
agent on the basis of the veriable signal z (namely in cases II and III of Proposition 2).
However, if 2 is su¢ ciently large but nite, the key results of the paper are qualitatively
the same as in the case where the principal only uses subjective incentives for the agent. A
formal proof of this claim is provided in Appendix B. The intuition behind it is as follows
(also see Baker et al. 1994). If the agent is incentivized on the basis of the veriable signal
z, he will vary his e¤ort level with the realization of the parameter . However, variation
in the agents e¤ort level is costly because the agents e¤ort costs are convex. For these
costs the agent must be compensated through his wage. Therefore, if 2 is su¢ ciently
high, using objective incentives is so costly such that it is always optimal to also include
subjective incentives in the agents contract, in which case all results of the paper hold.
6This is not a strong assumption, since the supervisors report d can easily be made
veriable information (for example, d can be a written report). See also e.g. Prendergast
and Topel (1996), Giebe and Gürtler (2012), and Thiele (2013), who make the same
assumption.
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utility equals UA > 0. Following Baker et al. (1994), the agent is assumed to
play a trigger strategy that prescribes to always shirk if the supervisor once
evaluated performance incorrectly (d 6= V ).
The supervisors utility in period t is given by:
US = wS + UA, (2)
where wS denotes the supervisors compensation, and  denotes the supervi-
sors altruism towards the agent. The supervisors compensation is dened
as wS   + z   db. The variable  is the supervisors base salary.  ties
the supervisors compensation to his evaluation of the agents performance.
Finally,  is a bonus which is paid out if the veriable signal about the agents
performance, z, is high (z = 1). Note that the supervisors contract is also
fully enforceable.
The supervisor may have standard selsh preferences, in which case  =
 = 0. Alternatively, the supervisor may be altruistic towards the agent, in
which case  =  > 0. It holds that  < 1, implying the altruistic supervisor
always cares more for his own compensation than for the agents utility. I
assume that the supervisors altruism is specic to the agent, and not a
general trait towards all people. It follows that the supervisors reservation
utility, US > 0, is independent of his type.7 Further, the agent and the
supervisor learn  before they accept or reject the principals job o¤er.8 Also,
it is assumed that the principal does not observe .9 Finally, for simplicity
the probability that the supervisor is altruistic towards the agent equals
Pr [ = ] = 1
2
, which is common knowledge.
The principals prots are given by the agents performance V , minus the
agents and the supervisors compensation:
 = V   wS   wA. (3)
7Of course, US may incorporate that the supervisor expects to have some degree of
altruism towards another agent he may work with when taking his outside option.
8In light of the dynamic nature of the model, this is a realistic assumption. Alterna-
tively, one could imagine that the agent and supervisor have been co-workers at the rm.
During that period they formed some social relationship. The formal model then starts
at the point when the principal o¤ers one of the co-workers a promotion to the position
of supervisor.
9As will become clear in the analysis, unless the supervisors contract screens for one
type, the principal cannot learn the supervisors type over time either.
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The principals reservation utility  is normalized to zero. To make the
problem interesting, it is assumed that:
1
2
  UA   US > 0. (4)
Assumption (4) ensures that, if the agent exerts the rst-best e¤ort level
and the agent and the supervisor dont earn a rent, hiring an agent and a
supervisor is attractive.
The order of the game is as follows.
1) In some period t, the principal is matched to one agent and one super-
visor.
2) The supervisors type  is randomly drawn, and observed by the agent
and the supervisor.
3) The principal o¤ers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the agent and the
supervisor. I impose that the supervisors contract is uniform, that is, the
principal cannot o¤er a menu of contracts to the supervisor.10 All players
observe the content of both contracts.
4) The agent and the supervisor decide whether or not to accept their
contract. Without loss of generality, I assume that all players receive their
reservation utility in period t unless both the agent and the supervisor accept
their contract.
5) If both the agent and the supervisor accept their contract, the agent
exerts e¤ort, the supervisor gives a performance evaluation, and payo¤s re-
alize.
6) Period t+1 starts. If both the agent and the supervisor accepted their
contract, the game is played again from the third stage. Otherwise, the game
is played again from the rst stage. In this case, the principal is matched to
a new agent and a new supervisor.
4 Analysis
In this section I solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game by
using backward induction. Subsection 4.1 introduces the central agency prob-
lem, namely that the supervisor may want to bias performance evaluations.
10A motivation for this assumption is the equal pay for equal work principle. The
assumption also rules out that, within a rm, some supervisors are imposed a penalty for
giving high performance evaluations while others are not.
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After that, I derive the agents optimal e¤ort choice and participation deci-
sion. In subsection 4.3 the optimal contracts for the supervisor and the agent
are derived. At this stage, the principals choice whether or not to screen for
a supervisor type is still kept exogenous. The principals screening decision
is analyzed in subsection 4.4.
4.1 The supervisors evaluation decision
After the agent has exerted e¤ort and his performance V has realized, the
supervisor decides to give a high or low performance rating to the agent. The
evaluation of the agents performance a¤ects the supervisors utility both in
the current period t and in the future. The supervisors marginal utility in
period t from giving a high performance rating is (   ) b, where  reects
the supervisors altruistic utility from giving the agent a high performance
evaluation and  reects the supervisors monetary costs from doing so. De-
pending on  ?  and the realization of the agents performance V 2 f0; 1g,
four cases can be distinguished. In two of these cases, the supervisor may
have an incentive to bias performance evaluations. If  >  and V = 0, the
supervisor may have an incentive to give an unwarranted high performance
evaluation. If  <  and V = 1, the supervisor may have an incentive to give
an unwarranted low performance evaluation. In both cases, the supervisors
marginal benet in period t from biasing the performance evaluation can be
written as j   j b  0. In the remaining two cases, the marginal benet in
period t from biasing the performance evaluation equals   j   j b  0.
In the repeated game, the supervisor will only report performance truth-
fully in period t if the following holds: reporting performance truthfully
yields rents in the future, the discounted value of which exceeds the current
marginal benet from biasing the performance evaluation. Formally, this
requires:

1  

U trS  max

U bS;US
	  j   j b, and (5)

1  

U trS  max

U bS;US
	    j   j b. (6)
where U trS is the supervisors per-period utility from the job, given that he
reports performance truthfully in period t, and U bS is the supervisors per-
period utility from the job, given that he biases the performance evaluation
in period t. Note that, because he can always leave the rm, the supervisor
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earns at least his reservation utility after biasing the performance evaluation.
Condition (5) therefore ensures that the supervisor enjoys a weakly positive
rent from his job. In turn, this implies that the supervisor is always willing
to accept the job. In addition to this, if his marginal benet from biasing
the performance evaluation equals   j   j b  0, the supervisor will always
report performance truthfully. In other words, condition (6) is slack. In the
remainder of this subsection, U trS and U
b
S are derived explicitly.
Given that the supervisor reports performance truthfully, the agent will
exert some optimal e¤ort level e (to be derived in the next subsection). The
probability that V = 1 equals e, and given that E [] = 1, the expected
probability that z = 1 also equals e. It follows that the supervisors utility
from the job when rating performance correctly is equal to:
U trS =  + e
 (   b) + UA. (7)
If the supervisor biased a performance evaluation, the agent will hence-
forth shirk. This implies that the signal z will always be low in the future.
Even though the agent shirks, if  > , the supervisor nds it nevertheless
attractive to give a high evaluation report. In this case, the agent always
earns the bonus b, implying he will stay with the rm.11 However, if  < ,
the supervisor always claims performance was low, implying the agent only
earns the base salary a. Depending on whether a < UA or a  UA, the agent
will leave or stay with the rm. In case the agent leaves the rm, the su-
pervisor also loses his job by assumption. Hence, the supervisors per-period
utility from the job after biasing the performance evaluation is equal to:
U bS =
8<:
 + a+ (   ) b
 + a
US
if   
if  <  and a  UA
if  <  and a < UA
. (8)
11To see this, suppose that the supervisor will report performance truthfully, implying
the agent will optimally exert some e¤ort level e (to be derived in the next section). To
make the job attractive to the agent, the principal must then pay the agent a base salary
at least equal to:
a  UA + 1
2
 (e)2   eb.
Next, suppose that, after both players have accepted the job, the supervisor chooses to
bias the performance evaluation upward. The agent then earns the bonus irrespective of
his performance, and so it becomes optimal for him to shirk. Given the minimum base
salary derived above, the agents utility from the job now becomes a+b  UA+ 12 (e)2+
(1  e) b. Since e  1 by assumption, this is always greater than the agents reservation
utility UA.
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Finally, the supervisor already enjoys either U trS or U
b
S in the rst period
he is employed. The reason is that the agent knows whether or not the super-
visor will evaluate performance truthfully. This follows from the assumptions
that the agent observes the supervisors type and contract.
4.2 The agents e¤ort and participation decision
Given that the supervisor reports performance truthfully, the agents optimal
e¤ort choice is:
e =
b

. (9)
Note that, since the rst best e¤ort-level equals eFB = 1

, the rst-best level
of the bonus equals bFB = 1. If the supervisor does not report performance
truthfully, the agent will exert zero e¤ort. The reason is that the supervisor
will give either a high or low performance evaluation, independent of the
agents performance. In that case, exerting e¤ort yields the agent no marginal
benet.
Any contract o¤ered to the agent should satisfy the agents participation
constraint. Given the agents e¤ort choice, and assuming the supervisor
reports performance truthfully, this constraint reads:
a+
1
2
b2

 UA. (10)
4.3 Optimal contracts
In this subsection the optimal contracts for the agent and supervisor are
derived. The principals screening decision is still kept exogenous. It is
analyzed in the following subsection. I start this subsection by establishing
the following intermediary result. Suppose that the principal wants to attract
some supervisor type and have him report performance truthfully. Then,
depending on the supervisors contract, it may be that U bS > US or U
b
S  US
(see (8)). However, the principal is better o¤ the lower U bS is. The intuition is
that, the lower the supervisors utility after biasing a performance evaluation,
the less total compensation he requires to be willing to report performance
truthfully. Since the supervisor can always take his outside option, a lower
bound on U bS is given by US. It follows that the principal strictly prefers
U bS  US to U bS > US.
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The next thing to note is that the principal can set the supervisors base
salary  as low as necessary to ensure that U bS  US holds (see (8)). Moreover,
doing so is costless. This holds because the base salary  and the bonus
 are substitutes in the supervisors compensation, given that he reports
performance truthfully (see (7)). A low base salary can thus be compensated
for by a higher value of . Lemma 1 follows:
Lemma 1 The principal sets the supervisors base salary  su¢ ciently low,
such that U bS  US holds for each supervisor type the principal attracts.
Before we turn to the optimal contracts, note that Lemma 1 implies that
the supervisor will report performance truthfully if:

1  

 + e (   b) + UA   US
  j   j b. (11)
4.3.1 Attracting one supervisor type (screening)
If screening for one supervisor type is optimal, the principal o¤ers the fol-
lowing contracts to the agent and supervisor.
Proposition 1 Suppose screening for one supervisor type is optimal. The
supervisors optimal contract only attracts the altruistic type. The supervi-
sors base salary  satises Lemma 1, and it holds that:
 =  > 0, and   1
2
 > 0.
The supervisors total compensation equals wS = US   UA.
The agents optimal contract is given by:
a = UA   1
2
< UA and b = bFB = 1.
The agent earns his reservation utility from the job, UA = UA.
Proof. Appendix A.
The optimal contracts can be explained as follows. First, screening re-
veals the supervisors type which is valuable information to the principal.
14
The reason is that it enables her to make the supervisor indi¤erent to his
evaluation report. This is achieved by equating  to the supervisors type .
The benet is that the supervisor will report performance truthfully with-
out requiring costly rents to do so (one can easily see this in condition (5)).
Moreover, since the supervisor is indi¤erent to his evaluation report for any
value of b, it is optimal to pay the agent the rst-best level of the bonus,
b = bFB = 1. Note that because the optimal screening contract attracts
only the altruistic type, the contract contains a monetary cost for reporting
high performance ( =  > 0).
Second, the reason that the supervisors contract screens for the altru-
istic type is as follows. As explained above, given that  = , the super-
visor requires the lowest possible compensation level to report performance
truthfully, which equals wS = US   UA. Importantly, since it holds that
 >  = 0, the altruistic type requires a lower compensation level than the
selsh type. The intuition is that in contrast to the selsh type, the altruistic
type enjoys working with the agent. Next, since both types are equally likely
to occur, the supervisor is equally likely to accept his contract independent
of the type screened for. It follows that the principals expected prots from
screening are highest if she screens for the altruistic supervisor.12
Third, the supervisors compensation depends positively on the signal z
via the bonus  > 0. The intuition is that the supervisor is optimally paid a
low base salary , as implied by Lemma 1. However, it must still hold that
reporting performance truthfully is su¢ ciently attractive for the altruistic
type. This is ensured by the bonus .
Fourth, to see why the supervisors contract only attracts the altruistic
type, note that the wage di¤erential explained above implies that reporting
performance truthfully yields the selsh supervisor less than his reservation
utility. Hence, the selsh type may only be hired given that he biases the
agents performance evaluation. If the selsh supervisor biases the perfor-
12If, contrary to the assumption made, the selsh type is su¢ ciently more abundant than
the altruistic type, the principal may prefer to screen for the selsh type. It is possible to
show that such a screening contract exists if it holds that 1 UA < 1. If this contract is
accepted by the supervisor, the principals prots are the same as in Proposition 1, minus
the compensating wage di¤erential the supervisors altruism gives rise to. The possibility
that screening for the selsh type dominates screening for the altruistic type only a¤ects
the rst result of Proposition 3: for low values of the discount factor, it may be optimal
to screen for the selsh type rather than for the altruistic type. However, the intuition
behind the optimality of screening per se remains the same, namely that screening enables
the principal to incentivize the supervisor at lower costs.
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mance evaluation, he will bias the evaluation downward. The reason is that
giving a high performance evaluation imposes a monetary cost upon the su-
pervisor ( =  > 0). However, expecting this, the agent will not accept his
contract in the rst place. This is true because the agent will only earn the
base salary from the job, which is below his reservation utility. If the agent
rejects his contract, I assume that the principal does not hire the supervi-
sor either. It follows that the screening contract only attracts the altruistic
supervisor type.
Last, the principal pays the agent such a low base salary that the agent
earns only his reservation utility from the job. This is optimal even though
raising the agents utility decreases the altruistic supervisors compensation.
The reason is that the supervisor always cares more for his own utility than
the agents utility ( < 1). It is therefore not possible for the principal to
gain from paying the agent a higher compensation and cut the supervisors
compensation more than proportionally.
By way of summary, if the principal screens for the altruistic supervisor,
the supervisor nor the agent earn a rent, and the agent exerts the rst-
best e¤ort level. Therefore, screening yields the principal rst-best prots,
conditional on the supervisor and the agent accepting their contract.
4.3.2 Attracting both supervisor types (pooling)
If the principal optimally attracts both supervisor types, she o¤ers the fol-
lowing contracts to the agent and supervisor.
Proposition 2 Suppose the principal optimally attracts both supervisor types.
Denote by L, M , and H threshold values of the discount factor, where it
holds that 0 < L < M < H < 1. There are three di¤erent cases:
Case I applies for  2 [H ; 1), in which it holds that:
I = 0,
wS;I = US, and
bI = 1.
Case II applies for  2  0; L and  2 M ; H. The only di¤erence with
case I is that:
bII =

1  UA < 1.
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Case III applies for  2  L; M, in which it holds that:
III =

2

1  
1  
UA
bIII

,
wS;III = US  

2
UA +

2
1  

bIII , and
bIII = 1  

2
1  

< 1.
It holds that bI > b

II > b

III > 0, w

S;I = w

S;II < w

S;III , and 

III >
0. Furthermore, for all cases it holds that 1) the agents base salary a
is set such that, given his e¤ort choice, the bonus b, and the supervisors
contract, the agent earns his reservation utility from the job (UA = UA), 2)
the agents base salary is below the agents reservation utility (a < UA),
3) the supervisors base salary  satises Lemma 1, and 4) the supervisor
receives a bonus conditional on the signal about the agents performance being
high ( > 0).
Proof. Appendix A.
All cases from Proposition 2 share the property that the bonus  > 0.
The intuition is identical to the one given in the previous subsection. The
supervisor is paid a low base salary to make biasing performance ratings
unattractive (Lemma 1). The bonus  > 0 compensates the supervisor
for the low base salary, given that he reports performance truthfully. Also,
the agent always earns his reservation utility from the job. This is optimal,
simply because it minimizes the agents total compensation level. In the
remainder of this subsection, the distinguishing properties of each case from
Proposition 2 are discussed in detail.
Case I. The most remarkable property of case I is that it sets I = 0.
The supervisors compensation is thus independent of his evaluation of the
agents performance. By the intuition from Proposition 1, this is the most
e¢ cient way to induce truthful ratings from the selsh type. However, by
the same logic, I = 0 is very ine¢ cient when inducing truthful ratings from
the altruistic type. To see why I = 0 is nevertheless optimal, recall rst
that the supervisor will report performance truthfully if:

1  
 
wS + UA   US
  j   j b. (12)
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Second, given  = 0, this condition is only satised for the selsh type
( = 0) if it holds that wS  US. Note that the supervisor cannot be paid a
lower compensation level, since otherwise the selsh type will not accept the
job. Third, given  = 0 and wS = US, condition (12) for the altruistic type
reduces to:

1  UA  b. (13)
Hence, if the above condition holds, the altruistic type will report perfor-
mance truthfully even if there is no monetary penalty attached to reporting
high performance, and the supervisor is paid the lowest possible compensa-
tion level.
The intuition behind this result is that the altruistic supervisor enjoys
working with the agent, as measured by UA. As long as he reports perfor-
mance truthfully, this utility cannot be extracted from the altruistic type be-
cause doing so would violate the selsh types participation constraint. How-
ever, after biasing a performance evaluation, the optimal contract ensures
that the supervisors utility equals at most his reservation utility (Lemma
1). The altruistic supervisor thus enjoys a rent as long as he rates per-
formance correctly. The implication is that altruism not only provides an
incentive to bias performance evaluations, it also provides a motivation to
report performance truthfully. Moreover, if the supervisor is su¢ ciently pa-
tient, as measured by , the latter e¤ect outweighs the former. If this is
the case, altruism provides a net incentive to report performance truthfully,
rather than to bias performance evaluations. This is the rst key result of
the paper:
Corollary 1 If condition (13) holds, supervisors altruism provides a net
incentive to report performance truthfully, rather than to bias performance
evaluations.
Next, in case I, the supervisor is assumed to be so patient (  H) that
the altruistic type prefers to report performance truthfully, even if b = 1
and UA = UA. It follows that both supervisor types report performance
truthfully, the agent is provided rst-best incentives, and the agent and the
supervisor are paid the lowest possible compensation level. There is no set
of contracts that could yield higher prots. Finally, note that for reasonable
values of the discount factor, say   0:8, condition (13) is satised even if
the agents rst-best bonus is a factor four higher than the agents outside
option utility. Therefore, case I is likely to apply in real workplace settings.
18
Case II. This case is almost identical to case I, except that it applies
for lower values of the supervisors patience ( < H). The implication is
that, if b = 1 and UA = UA, supervisor altruism no longer provides a net
incentive to report performance truthfully, but rather to bias evaluations. In
case II, the principal deals with this problem in a simple way: she reduces the
agents bonus till the point where the supervisors altruism again provides a
net incentive to report performance truthfully. Hence, bII =

1 UA < 1.
One may note that an alternative way to solve this problem is to raise
the agents utility above UA. This is never optimal, however. The reason
is that the supervisor always cares more for his own compensation than
for the agents utility ( < 1). It is therefore more e¢ cient to increase
the supervisors rents directly by raising his own compensation, rather than
indirectly by raising the agents utility. This brings us to the nal case.
Case III. As does case II, case III applies for relatively low values of the
discount factor. However, in contrast to case II, the principal does not de-
sign the agents and supervisors contract such that the supervisors altruism
provides a net incentive to report performance truthfully. Instead, she sim-
ply raises the supervisors compensation to ensure that reporting truthfully
yields su¢ cient rents for the altruistic type. This response gives rise to two
trade-o¤s.
First, the principal optimally lowers the agents bonus below the rst-
best level. The reason is that the supervisor would enjoy a lower marginal
benet in period t from biasing the performance evaluation. The benet to
the principal is that the supervisor now requires lower rents from reporting
truthfully, which in turn lowers his compensation.
Second, the principal imposes a penalty on the supervisor for giving a
high performance evaluation, that is, III > 0. To see why this is optimal,
note that raising the supervisors compensation not only increases the altru-
istic types rents from reporting truthfully, but also the selsh types. The
principal can therefore impose a penalty upon the supervisor for giving a
high performance evaluation, without changing the selsh types decision to
report truthfully. The benet of doing so is that the altruistic type enjoys
a lower marginal benet in period t from biasing performance evaluations.
This, in turn, lowers the supervisors compensation. Whether case III yields
higher prots than case II depends on the value of the discount factor. In
the proof of the Proposition, the threshold values of the discount factor are
explicitly derived.
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Summarizing this subsection, o¤ering the pooling contract to the super-
visor yields rst-best prots if the discount factor is high (case I). For lower
values of the discount factor the principals prots are below rst-best be-
cause the agents incentives are reduced (case II), or because the agents
incentives are reduced and the supervisor earns a rent (case III).
4.4 Optimal screening
In this subsection, the principals decision whether or not to o¤er the screen-
ing contract to the supervisor is analyzed. Denote by E [] the principals
per-period prots given that the agent and the supervisor accepted their con-
tract, which will be dened later on. Next, if the principal o¤ers the pooling
contract to the supervisor, there is a probability ' = 0 that the supervisor
will reject his contract, whereas if the principal o¤ers the screening contract
there is a probability of ' = 1
2
that the supervisor rejects his contract. If the
supervisor rejects his contract, all players by assumption earn their outside
option in period t. In that case the principal is matched to a new agent and
a new supervisor in period t + 1. The principals expected lifetime utility
from being matched to one agent and one supervisor can now be written as:
E

L

= '

0 + E

L
	
+ (1  ') 1
1  E [] , (14)
which is equivalent to:
E

L

=
1  '
(1  ) (1  ')E [] . (15)
Lets now dene the value of E []. Using the results from Proposition 1,
if the principal screens for the altruistic supervisor, E [] equals:
E [] =
1
2
  (1  )UA   US > 0, (16)
where the sign follows from assumption (4) and  > 0. If the principal
attracts both supervisor types, the value of E [] depends on which case
from Proposition 2 applies. For each case, the principals prots are given
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by:
E [I ] =
1
2
  UA   US > 0, (17)
E [II ] =
bII

  1
2
(bII)
2

  UA   US, and (18)
E [III ] =
bIII

  1
2
(bIII)
2

  1  


2
bIII  

1  
2

UA   US, (19)
respectively. It is now possible to derive when screening is optimal by com-
paring the expected lifetime utility from screening to the expected lifetime
utility from pooling.
By Proposition 2, if the principal o¤ers the pooling contract to the su-
pervisor and   H , the contracts from case I are optimal. It follows that,
conditional on   H , screening is optimal if:
1  1
2
(1  )  1  1
2

E []  1
1  E [

I ] . (20)
Rewriting this condition yields that screening is optimal if the discount factor
is su¢ ciently high:
  2  E [
]
E [I ]
(21)
Note that the threshold value of the discount factor is smaller than 1 since
E [] > E [I ]. The intuition behind this result is as follows. If the princi-
pal screens for the altruistic type, conditional on the supervisor accepting his
contract, she enjoys the compensating wage di¤erential that altruism gives
rise to. I call this motive the wage di¤erential motive for screening. As
revealed by condition (21), the wage di¤erential motive only makes screening
attractive if the principal is su¢ ciently patient. The reason is that screen-
ing implies that the supervisor may reject his job a number of times. In
expectation, the wage di¤erential is therefore only enjoyed somewhere in the
future.
Next, by Proposition 2, if the principal o¤ers the pooling contract to the
supervisor and  < H , the contracts from case II or case III are optimal.
Unfortunately, the equivalent of condition (20) for cases II and III is di¢ -
cult to solve explicitly for the discount factor. However, by the following
argument it can still be shown that screening is optimal for low values of
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the discount factor. First, recall from Proposition 2 that, if the principal
attracts both supervisor types and  2  0; L, case II applies. Hence, the
principals prots from attracting both supervisor types are given by E [II ].
Second, E [II ] is lower for lower values of the discount factor.
13 The reason
is that the agents bonus bII is lower for lower values of the discount fac-
tor. As explained in the previous subsection, this is done to ensure that the
altruistic supervisor prefers to report performance truthfully. Third, in the
limit where the discount factor is zero, the agents bonus is optimally equal
to zero. It follows that E [II ] is strictly negative. However, the principals
prots from screening are always strictly positive. Therefore, there must be
a range of low discount factors for which screening is optimal. The intuition
behind this result is that screening allows the principal to give the agent
stronger incentives. I call this the incentive motivefor screening. The nal
Proposition follows:
Proposition 3 There exist two ranges of discount factors,  2 (0; ] and
 2 [; 1) where  > 0 and  < 1, for which the principal optimally screens
for altruistic supervisors.
Finally, note that a similar limit argument as given above for case II
cannot be established for case III. The simple reason is that case III only
applies for intermediate values of the discount factor (see Proposition 2).
However, as in case II, it holds that the principals prots from attracting
both supervisor types are lower, the lower the value of the discount factor.14
The reason is that, in order to reduce the supervisors compensation, the
agent is optimally paid a lower bonus if the discount factor is lower. Hence,
also in case III the incentive motive may imply that screening is optimal for
relatively low values of the discount factor. In addition to this, note that in
13Taking derivatives yields:
@E [II ]
@
=
1  bII
 (1  )2 > 0,
where the sign follows from the fact that bII < 1.
14Taking derivatives yields:
@E [III ]
@
=

43
[2   (1  ) ] > 0,
where the sign follows from the fact that bIII > 0.
22
both cases II and III, the wage di¤erential motive may imply that screening
is optimal for relatively high values of the discount factor. However, due to
computational limitations, it cannot be established when these motives are
su¢ ciently strong such that screening is optimal.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper studies how rms can optimally deal with the possibility of le-
niency bias through designing contracts for employees and potentially al-
truistic supervisors. Two key results emerge from this analysis. First, the
optimal contracts sometimes ensure that supervisors altruism provides a net
incentive to report performance truthfully, rather than to bias performance
evaluations. Second, if the discount factor is relatively low or high, the prin-
cipal optimally screens for the altruistic supervisor.
The present analysis assumes that the principal can only o¤er a uniform
contract to the supervisor, which seems to be a realistic assumption in many
workplace settings. Nevertheless, if the principal has the possibility to o¤er
a menu of contracts to the supervisor it could be optimal for her to exploit
this possibility, and hence the results found here may be a¤ected. I leave this
potentially interesting case for further research.
Another avenue for further research is to allow for the possibility of collu-
sion. A detailed analysis of collusion proof contracts in an innitely repeated
game is provided by Thiele (2013). Interestingly, the analysis by Thiele
(2013) and the one presented here display close similarities. Specically, an
altruistic supervisor can be interpreted as a supervisor who is prone to collud-
ing with the agent against the principal. Both Thiele (2013) and the present
analysis reveal that, to eliminate bias in performance evaluation, the supervi-
sor may require a rent, and the agents incentives may be optimally reduced.
It would be interesting to study whether and how social relationships and
the possibility of collusion interact in the workplace.
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Appendix A. Proofs
This Appendix contains the proofs of the results described in Propositions 1
and 2. To facilitate the reading of the proofs, I start by listing the constraints
the principal faces when designing the agents and supervisors contracts.
First, given that the supervisor reports performance truthfully, the agents
incentive compatibility constraint is:
e =
b

, (22)
and, second, the agents participation constraint is:
UA = a+
1
2
b2

 UA. (23)
Last, the altruistic and selsh supervisor typestruthtelling constraints are
given by:

1  

 +
b

(   b) + UA   US

 j   j b, and (24)

1  

 +
b

(   b)  US

 j0  j b, (25)
respectively. Note that (24) and (25) ensure that reporting performance
truthfully yields the supervisor at least his reservation utility. Finally, recall
that  must satisfy Lemma 1. That is,  must be set su¢ ciently low such
that U bS  US holds for each supervisor type the principal attracts, where U bS
is given by (8).
Proof of Proposition 1
In this proof the optimal contracts are derived, given that the principal op-
timally screens for one supervisor type. The proof relies on the assumption
that the principal optimally screens for the altruistic supervisor type. In the
main text it is proved that, and explained why this assumption holds.
The principals problem is to design the contracts that maximize her
expected prots subject to the agents incentive compatibility constraint (22),
the agents participation constraint (23), and the altruistic supervisor types
truthtelling constraint (24). Moreover, the supervisors contract must not
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attract the selsh supervisor type. I start by deriving the optimal contracts
assuming the latter condition is satised. After that, it is checked whether
this condition holds, given the optimal contract for the supervisor. The
principals problem can now be written as:
max
a;b;;
E [] =
b

 

a+
b2


 

 +
b

(   b)

s.t. (23) and (24):
The rst-order conditions to the problem are:
@E []
@a
=  1 + 1 + 2 
1   = 0, (26)
@E []
@b
=
1

  2 b

 

1

   2 b



+ 1
b

+ (27)
2


1  

1

   2 b

 + 
b


  j   j

= 0,
@E []
@
=
b2

  2


1  
b2

+
   
j   jb

= 0, and (28)
@E []
@
=   b

+ 2

1  
b

= 0, (29)
where 1 and 2 are the Lagrange multipliers on the agents participation
constraint (23) and the altruistic supervisors truthtelling constraint (24),
respectively. Solving the system of rst-order conditions yields 1 = 1   >
0, 2 = 1  > 0, 
 = , and b = 1. From 1 > 0 it follows that the
agents participation constraint (23) binds. This implies the agents base
salary equals a = UA   12 < 0, where the sign follows from assumption (4).
Also, the agents utility from the job equals his reservation utility, UA = UA.
From 2 > 0 it follows that the altruistic supervisors truthtelling constraint
(24) binds. Solving (24), given the solutions found so far, yields  =  +

 
US     UA

, where the supervisors base salary  must satisfy Lemma
1. Next,  satises Lemma 1 if U bS  US holds for the altruistic supervisor.
Taking into account that  = , equation (8) yields this is the case if
  US   a. It follows that   12 > 0. Further, for any  that satises
Lemma 1, the supervisors total compensation level can now be computed to
be equal to wS = US   UA.
It must still be checked whether the supervisors contract indeed only
attracts the altruistic type. First note that, given the solutions found so far,
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the selsh types truthtelling constraint (25) reduces to:
  
1  UA  1, (30)
which can never hold. The selsh type will therefore give biased performance
evaluations if he accepts the job. Next, since it holds that the supervisors
monetary cost for reporting high performance is positive,  =  > 0, the
selsh supervisor will always give a low performance evaluation. Therefore,
the agent only earns his base salary from his job, which is below his reser-
vation utility, a < UA. It follows that the agent will not accept the job
if the supervisor is selsh. Finally, by assumption, in this case the selsh
supervisor is not hired either.
Proof of Proposition 2
In this proof the optimal contracts are derived, given that the principal op-
timally attracts both supervisor types. I start by establishing the following
two intermediate results.
First, it can never be optimal to attract both supervisor types, but have
only one of them report performance truthfully. The reason is that this strat-
egy is always dominated by the strategy to screen for one supervisor type.
To see this, note that if the principal screens, she can enjoy two possible
prot levels both of which occur with a probability of 1
2
. If the supervisor
accepts his job, prots equal the rst-best level (Proposition 1). If the su-
pervisor rejects his job, by assumption the principal enjoys her reservation
utility  = 0. In case both supervisor types are attracted but only one of
them reports performance truthfully, there are also two possible prot levels
that each occur with a probability of 1
2
. If the supervisor reports performance
truthfully, the principal enjoys at most the rst-best prot level. However, if
the supervisor biases performance evaluations, prots are strictly negative.
The reason is that the agent will exert zero e¤ort in this case, while hiring the
agent and supervisor is costly. Hence, it can never be optimal to attract both
supervisor types, but incentivize only one of the types to report performance
truthfully. It follows that both supervisor typestruthtelling constraints (24
and 25) must be satised in equilibrium.
Second, it must always hold that  2 [0; ]. The reason is that if  < 0
or  > , the principal could increase or decrease  and thereby lower both
typesmarginal benet in period t from rating performance incorrectly. This
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would be strictly prot-increasing, since then both types require lower rents
to be willing to report performance truthfully. Because it turns out that only
the lower constraint on  may bind in equilibrium, the following constraint
is added to the principals maximization problem:
  0. (31)
The principals problem can now be written as:
max
a;b;;
E [] =
b

 

a+
b2


 

 +
b

(   b)

s.t. (23), (24), (25), and (31).
The rst-order conditions to the problem are:
@E []
@a
=  1 + 1 + 2 
1   = 0, (32)
@E []
@b
=
1

  2 b

 

1

   2 b



+ 1
b

+ (33)
2


1  

1

   2 b

 + 
b


  j   j

+
3


1  

1

   2 b



  j0  j

= 0,
@E []
@
=
b2

  2


1  
b2

+
   
j   jb

  (34)
3


1  
b2

+
   0
j0  jb

+ 4 = 0, and
@E []
@
=   b

+ 2

1  
b

+ 3

1  
b

= 0, (35)
where 1, 2, 3, and 4 are the Lagrange multipliers on (23), (24), (25), and
(31), respectively. There are three qualitatively di¤erent sets of solutions
to the system of rst-order conditions. Which one applies will be shown to
depend on the value of the discount factor . I start by solving the case that
has been labelled case III in the main text.
Case III. Lets rst assume that the constraint on  does not bind, that
is,  > 0 and 4 = 0. Solving (34) and (35) then yields 2 = 3 = 12
1 

> 0,
implying that both supervisor typestruthtelling constraints (24 and 25) bind
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in equilibrium. Solving these constraints for  and  yields:
III =

2

1  
1  
UA
bIII

, and (36)
III =
1  

(   III)   

bIII

III   b
2
III

III + UA   US

, (37)
where the supervisors base salary III must satisfy Lemma 1. Solving (32)
yields 1 = 1   12 > 0. From this it follows that the agents participation
constraint (23) binds, implying that aIII = UA   12
(bIII)
2

and UA = UA.
Given the solutions found so far, solving (33) yields:
bIII = 1  

2
1  

< 1. (38)
One can now compute the supervisors total compensation level, which is
equal to:
wS;III = US  

2
UA +

2
1  

bIII . (39)
Next, recall that Lemma 1 states that it must hold for all supervisor
types attracted that the utility from biasing the performance evaluation is
weakly below the supervisors reservation utility, that is, U bS  US. Taking
into account that  > III > 0 and a

III < UA, equation (8) reveals this is
the case for the altruistic type if it holds that the supervisors base salary
satises the following condition: III  US   aIII   (   III) bIII . In
case the supervisor is selsh, it always holds that U bS  US. The reason is
that the agent will not accept the job given that the selsh type biases the
performance evaluation, as the selsh type biases the performance evaluation
downwards. By assumption, in this case the selsh supervisor is not hired
either. Further, the condition imposed on the base salary III by Lemma 1
implies that III > 0. To see this, note that given the condition, 

III can be
written as:
III 


(   III) 

1
2
   III

bIII > 0, (40)
where the sign follows from   1, 0 <  < 1, and 0 < bIII < 1.
Finally, recall that case III applies under the assumption that  > 0.
Rewriting III > 0 yields that this assumption only holds if:
bIII = 1  

2
1  

>

1  UA. (41)
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In turn, condition (41) is satised if and only if  2  L; M, where the
threshold values of the discount factor are dened as:
L  1 +   
p
1  2UA
2 +  + 2UA
, and (42)
M  1 +  +
p
1  2UA
2 +  + 2UA
. (43)
Note that L > 0 and L < M because 1 +  >
p
1  2UA > 0. The rst
inequality follows from UA > 0,  > 1, and  > 0. The second inequality
follows from assumption (4) and 0 <  < 1.
Cases I and II. Lets now assume that the condition on  binds, that is,
 = 0 and 4 > 0. If  = 0, there are two subcases. The rst subcase is where
the altruistic supervisors truthtelling constraint (24) binds, that is, 2 > 0.
This leads to what has been labeled case II in the main text. In solving this
subcase, it is assumed that also the selsh supervisors truthtelling constraint
(25) binds, that is, 3 > 0. Along the way, it is shown that this assumption
indeed holds.
Solving the supervisor typestruthtelling constraints (24 and 25), given
 = 0, yields:
bII =

1  UA, and (44)
II =

 
1  2 + 2  US   II+ 2U2A
 (1  )UA . (45)
One can now compute the supervisors compensation to be:
wS;II = US. (46)
Given the solutions found so far, the rst-order conditions (32), (33), and
(35) can be solved for the Lagrange multipliers. This yields:
1 =
1
 (1  ) 


1  UA   1 + 
1  


> 0, (47)
2 =
1
(1  )  [1   (1 + UA)] , and (48)
3 =
1



1  UA   1 + 
1  



> 0. (49)
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The signs of 1 and 3 follow from the assumptions that  = 0, which has
been shown above to imply that 
1 UA  1 +  2 1  > 0 (see condition (41)),
and  < 1. Moreover, since 1 > 0, the agents participation constraint (23)
binds, from which it follows that aII = UA  12
(bII)
2

and UA = UA. The proof
that II > 0 is analogous to the one given in case III. Proceeding in the same
way as there, one can check that:
II 

2 (1  )

2 (1  ) + 2UA

> 0. (50)
To conclude case II, recall that it has been assumed that 2 > 0 and
3 > 0. The latter assumption indeed holds, as shown in (49). However,
inspecting (48) reveals that the former assumption only holds if  < H ,
where the threshold value of the discount factor is dened as:
H  1
1 + UA
. (51)
One can check that M < H . This inequality follows from  > 1, UA > 0,
and  > 0. Therefore, case II applies for values of the discount factor such
that  2 (0; L] and  2 [M ; H).
The second subcase is where the altruistic supervisors truthtelling con-
straint (24) is slack, that is, 2 = 0. As shown above, this holds for values of
the discount factor  > H . The set of contracts that results has been labeled
case I in the main text. Solving the rst-order conditions (32), (33), and (35)
yields 1 = 1 > 0, 3 = 1  > 0, and b

I = 1. From 1 > 0 it follows that
the agents participation constraint (23) binds, implying that aI = UA   12
and UA = UA. From 3 > 0 it follows that the selsh supervisor types
truthtelling constraint (25) binds. Rewriting (25), given that I = 0, yields:
I = 
 
US   I

. (52)
One can now compute the supervisorss compensation to be:
wS;I = US. (53)
The proof that I > 0 is analogous to the one given in case III. Proceeding
in the same way as there, one can check that:
I 
1
2
 + 
 
1 + UA

> 0. (54)
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By conclusion, case III applies for  2  L; M, case II applies for  2
(0; L] and  2 [M ; H), and case I applies for the remaining values of the
discount factor,  2 [H ; 1). Also, it has been shown to hold that 0 < L <
M < H < 1.
Appendix B. Allowing for Objective Incentives
for the Agent
In this Appendix I show that, as long as 2 is su¢ ciently large, allowing for
objective incentives for the agent does not change the key results derived in
this paper. The way I model the veriable information about the agents
performance is identical to Baker et al. (1994).
Suppose that the agents contract also contains a bonus v to be paid if
the veriable signal is high (z = 1). Given that the supervisor reports per-
formance truthfully, and some realization of  which the agent has privately
observed, the agents optimal e¤ort choice is:
e =
b+ v

, (55)
which varies with . The agents participation constraint now reads:
E
"
a+
b+ v

(b+ v)  1
2


b+ v

2#
 UA, (56)
where the expectation runs over . Using E [] = 1 and E [2] = 1 + 2, the
participation constraint can be written as:
a+
1
2
b2 + 2bv +
 
1 + 2

v2

 UA. (57)
Rewriting (57) in another way yields that the agent must be paid at least a
total expected compensation level of:
wA  UA + 1
2
b2 + 2bv +
 
1 + 2

v2

. (58)
Equation (58) reveals that, if 2 > 0, the agents compensation rises faster in
v compared to b. The reason is as follows. If v > 0, the agent will sometimes
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exert a high e¤ort level and sometimes a low e¤ort level depending on the
realization of . Because e¤ort costs are convex, average e¤ort costs increase
in the variation in e, and therefore in 2. For these costs the agent must
be compensated. Using objective incentives for the agent thus generates its
own kind of agency costs. I assume that using only objective incentives for
the agent does not generate su¢ cient value to compensate the agent for his
reservation utility. One can show that this assumption holds if:
2 >
1  2UA
2UA
> 0, (59)
where the sign follows from assumption (4). In the following I derive the
optimal contracts in case the principal can also use objective incentives for
the agent.
First, note that the sets of contracts derived in case the principal screens
(Proposition 1) and in case the principal attracts both supervisor types and
  H  1
1+UA
(Proposition 2, case I), are still optimal. The reason is that
given these sets of contracts, the supervisor nor the agent earns a rent, and the
agent is induced to exert the rst-best e¤ort level. It follows that there is no
way to improve upon these sets of contracts by using objective incentives for
the agent. This observation already enables us to to conrm some key results.
First, given the contracts from Proposition 2, case I, the supervisors altruism
provides a net incentive to report performance truthfully, rather than to bias
performance evaluations (Corollary 1). Second, the proof that screening is
optimal for high values of the discount factor, presented in subsection 4.4,
depends only on the aforementioned sets of contracts. Since these sets of
contracts do not change, it follows that this result is insensitive to allowing
for objective incentives for the agent. In the remainder of this Appendix, I
derive the optimal contracts in case the principal attracts both supervisor
types and it holds that  < H . The derivations are largely similar to the
ones in the proof of Proposition 2.
Given the agents e¤ort e (55), E [] = 1, and E [2] = 1 + 2, the
altruistic and selsh supervisor will report performance truthfully if:

1  

 +
(b+ v) (   b) + v2

+ UA   US

 j   j b, and(60)

1  

 +
(b+ v) (   b) + v2

  US

 j0  j b, (61)
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respectively. Further, recall from the proof of Proposition 2 that it must hold
that:
  0. (62)
The principals problem can now be written as:
max
a;b;v;;
  =
b+ v

 
"
a+
b2 + 2bv +
 
1 + 2

v2

#
 
 +
(b+ v) (   b) + v2


,
s.t. (57), (60), (61), and (62).
The rst-order conditions to the problem are:
@ 
@a
=  1 + 1 + 2 
1   = 0, (63)
@ 
@b
=
1

  2b+ 2v

 

1

(   b)   b+ v


+ 1
b+ v

+ (64)
2


1  

   b

   b+ v

+ 
b+ v


  j   j

+
3


1  

   b

   b+ v


  j0  j

= 0,
@ 
@v
=
1

  2b+ 2
 
1 + 2

v

  
 
1 + 2
  b

+ 1
b+ v
 
1 + 2


+ (65)
2

1  
"

 
1 + 2
  b

+ 
b+ v
 
1 + 2


#
+ 3

1  

 
1 + 2
  b

= 0,
@ 
@
=
b+ v

b  2


1  
b+ v

b+
   
j   jb

  (66)
3


1  
b+ v

b+
   0
j0  jb

+ 4 = 0, and
@ 
@
=  b+
 
1 + 2

v

+ 2

1  
b+
 
1 + 2

v

+ 3

1  
b+
 
1 + 2

v

= 0,
(67)
where 1, 2, 3, and 4 are the Lagrange multipliers on (57), (60), (61),
and (62), respectively. As in Proposition 2, if  < H , two cases can be
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distinguished. Since the cases are closely comparable to cases II and III from
Proposition 2, they are again denoted by subscripts II and III. I start by
solving case III.
Case III. Lets rst assume that condition (62) does not bind, that is,
 > 0 and 4 = 0. Solving (63), (66), and (67) then yields 1 = 1  12 > 0
and 2 = 3 = 1 2 > 0. Hence, the agents participation constraint (57)
binds. This implies that UA = UA and aIII = UA   12
b2III+2bIIIvIII+(1+2)v2III

.
Further, both supervisor typestruthtelling constraints (60 and 61) also bind.
Solving these constraints yields:
III =

2

1  
1  
UA
bIII

, and (68)
III =

 
1 

IIIbIII + US   III

+ (bIII + vIII) bIII

III
bIII +
 
1 + 2

vIII
, (69)
where III must satisfy Lemma 1. Next, solving (64) and (65) for bIII and
vIII yields:
bIII = 1  

2
1  

1 + 2
2
, and (70)
vIII =

2
1  


2
> 0. (71)
Thus, in case III the principal optimally uses objective incentives for the agent
in order to reduce the rents the supervisor requires to report performance
truthfully.
To conclude case III, recall that it applies as long as it holds that III > 0.
This inequality can be written as:
bIII = 1  

2
1  

1 + 2
2
>

1  UA. (72)
Solving the above condition yields that it must hold that  2  L; M, where
the threshold values of the discount factor are given by:
L 
2 + 
 
1 + 2
 q2 2   2UA  1 + 2
22 + 
 
1 + 2

+ 2UA2
, and (73)
M 
2 + 
 
1 + 2

+
q
2

2   2UA
 
1 + 2

22 + 
 
1 + 2

+ 2UA2
. (74)
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Note that L and M only exist if the root terms in the expressions above are
well-dened. This is only the case if 2   2UA
 
1 + 2

> 0, which can be
written as:
2 >
2UA
1  2UA
. (75)
The above inequality is not necessarily implied by the assumption on the
minimum level of 2 (assumption (59)). It follows that case III may exist or
not exist, depending on the level of 2.
Case II. The next step is to derive the optimal contracts for  =2  L; M,
given that  < H (case II). This case always exists. To see this, rst note
that if L and M are not well-dened, case II applies for all  < H . Second,
given that it is well-dened, it can be easily checked that L > 0. For the
remainder of the proof, it does not matter whether or not M < H .
First note that a property of case II is that II = 0, since for any  >
0 case III is optimal. Next, case II can be easily solved by the following
argument. Lets suppose that the agents participation constraint (57) and
both supervisor typestruthtelling constraints (60 and 61) bind. If the agents
participation constraint (57) binds, it holds that UA = UA and aII = UA  
1
2
b2II+2bIIvII+(1+2)v2II

. Moreover, given II = 0, solving both supervisor types
truthtelling constraints (60 and 61) yields:
bII =

1  UA, and (76)
II =

 
US   II

bII +
 
1 + 2

vII
, (77)
where II must satisfy Lemma 1. Note that b

II < 1 by the assumption
that  < H . Next, for any base salary II that satises Lemma 1 and the
solutions found so far, the supervisors compensation can be computed to
be wS;II = US. The supervisor cannot be paid a lower compensation level,
since otherwise the selsh type will reject the job. It follows directly that
it is indeed optimal to have the agents participation constraint (57) and
both supervisor typestruthtelling constraints (60 and 61) bind. The reason
is that the agent earns the lowest possible compensation level (since (57)
binds), the supervisor earns the lowest possible compensation level, and the
agent receives the highest possible subjective bonus (note that bII cannot be
greater than 
1 UA, as this would imply that case III is optimal, see condition
(72)).
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Importantly, in case II the optimal contracts imply that supervisors al-
truism provides a net incentive to report performance truthfully (Corollary
1). To see this, note that given II = 0 and w

S;II = US, the altruistic types
truthtelling constraint (60) reduces to 
1 UA  bII , which always holds.
Finally, one can now derive the optimal value of the objective bonus vII .
Using E [] = 1, E [2] = 1 + 2, and the solutions found so far, the optimal
value of v is given by:
max
vII
E [II ] =

1 UA + vII

  US   (78)"
UA +
1
2
 

1 UA
2
+ 2 
1 UAvII +
 
1 + 2

v2II

#
,
which yields:
vII =
1  
1 UA
1 + 2
> 0, (79)
where the sign follows from bII =

1 UA < 1. Hence, in case II, the principal
avoids paying the supervisor rents, but at the costs of setting the subjective
bonus below the rst-best level. To get the agents e¤ort level closer to the
rst-best, the principal adds objective incentives to the agents contract.
It is now possible to conrm the nal key result, namely that screening is
optimal for relatively low values of the discount factor. The proof is analogous
to the one given in subsection 4.4. Recall that the principals per-period
utility from screening, conditional on the supervisor and agent accepting
their contract, equals 1
2
  (1  )UA US. This prot is strictly positive by
assumption (4) and  > 0. Next, suppose that  ! 0. For  = 0 it holds
that the subjective bonus equals bII = 0. By assumption (59), the principals
utility is strictly negative if she only uses an objective incentive scheme. It
follows that there must be a range of discount factors  2 (0; ) for which
screening is optimal, where  > 0.
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